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This article studies the problem of regulating a monopolist with unknown marginal cost.
The problem described di®ers from Baron and Myerson [1982] because we suppose that the
regulator faces a cash-in-advance constraint. The introduction of such a constraint may lead
to the collapse of the incentive system.
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1 Introduction
The problem we concentrate on is the following: a public authority faces a monopolistic producer
with unknown cost1. The authority tries to provide a public utility (bridge, road or sewer
system) to a bunch of consumer. This public utility is produced by the monopolist and ¯nanced
by government transfers. The contract o®ered by the government to the ¯rm speci¯es the
quantities that should be produced and a level of transfer. We assume that the government
doesn't know the cost function of the ¯rm.
The originality of this paper is to add up to the standard problem macroeconomics con-
straints. We will suppose that the public authority has only limited funds at disposal. This
constraints limits the possibilities for the government to buy the full consumer surplus associated
with the public utility. We believe that such constraints may be particularly relevant for the
case of developing countries.
We show that the presence of a wealth constraint distorts -in a non linear way- the quantity
produced by each type of ¯rm. These 'third best' distortions that come on top of the traditional
'second best' distortions are necessary to ful¯ll the wealth constraint. But these distortions may
lead to the collapse of the incentive system: it may be impossible to separate the di®erent types
of ¯rms. And hence, when the government is constrained, bunching is a non trivial issue.
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1The framework is similar to Baron and Myerson [1982] except that the ¯rm has no ¯xed cost.
12 Model
Our model is a simple model of adverse selection: the principal (public authority) contracts
with an agent (monopolistic private ¯rm) for the provision of a public utility. The agent is
responsible of the production and the principal ¯nances the production with transfers. At the
time of contracting, the principal does not know the cost conditions under which the ¯rm can
produce. We will assume that the good is produced by the ¯rm with a technology exhibiting
constant return to scale. The cost function of the ¯rm is µq, where µ is a constant marginal
cost and q is the quantity produced2. The marginal cost is private information to the ¯rm. The
principal only knows that µ 2 £ ´f µ 1;µ 2gwith µ1 <µ 2and the probabilities v1 and v2 =1¡v 1
of agent being µ1 and µ2. We call ¢µ = µ2 ¡ µ1.
The utility of the agents is:
UA = T ¡ µq
Where T is the transfer paid by the principal to the agent. Firm accepts the contract if it gets
more than its outside option normalized to zero.
When the agent produces a quantity q, the principal collects a surplus S(q). We assume that
S0 ¸ 0, S0( 0 )=+ 1 ,S 00 < 0a n dS 000 > 0. Our assumptions on S ensures that it is optimal to
have all types producing.
The utility of the principal is:
UP = S(q) ¡ T
The regulator o®ers a contract specifying the transfer T and the quantity q. We call T1;q 1,
the transfer paid to the type µ1 agent when he produces q1 and similarly, T2;q 2, the transfer
and production of µ2 agent.
The cash in advance constraint limits the transfer: they cannot exceed an upper limit denoted
T.
3 Results
3.1 Second best equilibrium




v1(S(q1) ¡ T1)+v 2( S( q 2)¡T 2)
s.t. 8 i;j =1 ;2:
T1 ¡ µ1q1 ¸ T2 ¡ µ1q2 (IC1)
T2 ¡µ2q2 ¸T1 ¡µ2q1 (IC2)
T1 ¡µ1q1 ¸0( IR1)
T2 ¡µ2q2 ¸0( IR2)
The two relevant constraints of this problem are IC1 and IR2.
2Equivalently, we could interpret q as the quality of the good produced.
2Proposition 1 The solution to the problem [P1] is given by:
qSB
1 = S0¡1(µ1)( 1 )
q SB









This solution is standard.
3.2 Wealth constrained equilibria
We now introduce the wealth constraint. The constraint implies that the principal cannot
transfer the agent more than T. We said that the constraint is relevant if the maximal transfer
T is smaller than the highest transfer paid by the principal in the second best equilibrium3.T h e




v1(S(q1) ¡ T1)+v 2( S( q 2)¡T 2)
s.t. (IC1), (IC2), (IR1), (IR2)a n d
T 1;T 2 ·T (WC)
Lemma 1 When T · µ1qSB
1 +¢ µqSB
2 , the e±cient type agent (µ1) will be paid T.
Proof. If T<T SB
1 , the solution of P1 cannot be replicated in P2. Then, at least one of
the transfers in P2 is given by the constraint (WC). A necessary condition for implementation
is: q1 ¸ q2 and T1 ¸ T2. Then the constraint (WC) binds (at least) for T1.





v1(S(q1) ¡ T)+v 2( S( q 2)¡µ 2a 2)
s.t.
(¹1) T = µ1q1 +¢ µq2
(¹2) T2 = q2µ2 · T
The solution of this optimization program is given in our second proposition.
Proposition 2 (i) If µ1 ¸ v1µ2 and T · T
¤ = µ2S0¡1( µ2µ1v2
µ1¡v1µ2), the equilibrium is a pooling
equilibrium:




T1 = T2 = T (4)

















T ¡ µ 1 q WC
1 ¡¢µqWC
2 =0 ( 7 )
And the transfers are give by the constraints WC and IR2.
T1 = T (8)
T2 = µ2qWC
2 (9)
The proof of proposition 2 is relegated to an appendix. Before explaining the result of proposition
2, it is useful to make some comparative static and study the e®ect of a change in T. This is
done in proposition 3:
Proposition 3 In the separating equilibrium, the value of ¹1 is a decreasing an convex function
of T,w i t hlimT!0 ¹1 =+ 1and limT!TSB
1 ¹1 = v1





Call the right hand side G(¹1). Then ¹1 = G¡1(T). Given our assumptions on S, G is increasing
and concave, because S0¡1 is increasing and concave. Then G¡1 is decreasing and convex. (ii)
At the limit when T goes to TSB
1 , the problem is identical to the problem P1 and therefore the
solution is identical. i.e. ¹1 = v1. When T goes to zero, the right hand side of the (7) must go
to zero. Given that S0( 0 )=+ 1 ,w eh a v et h a tG ¡ 1( 0 )=+ 1 .
Now we turn back to the equilibria described in proposition 2. On the top of the traditional
second best trade o® between e±ciency and rent extraction that leads to distortions in q2, there
is now a third best distortion necessary to ful¯ll the wealth constraint. If we call ¹0
1 = ¹1 ¡ v1,














If we compare these expressions with the second best equilibrium, it is clear that the last terms
on the right hand member measures the distortions imposed to ful¯ll the wealth constraint. As
established by proposition 3, these third best distortions increases when the constraint becomes
more severe (¹0
1 increases).
The addition of a third best distortion in q1 and q2 may lead to the collapse of the incentive
system. It will be the case if the distorted actions doesn't satisfy the necessary condition for
implementation, namely keeping q1 greater than q2
4 If q1 is more distorted than q2, there is a
level of ¹0
1 and a corresponding level of T (called T
¤) such that the value of q1 g i v e nb y( 5 )i s
smaller than the value of q2 given by (6). Therefore, for these values of the T, the only feasible
mechanism is a pooling mechanism.
4This question is not an issue in the second best problem, because only the action of the ine±cient agent
(µ2) is distorted. When both actions are modi¯ed, the question of keeping the action scheme decreasing becomes
crucial.
44 Conclusion
In this paper, we have shown that when the government is constrained on the level of transfer he
can make to the ¯rms, there is under-provision of public facilities. Moreover pooling contracts
where both types of ¯rm produce the same quantities and receive the same transfer may be the
optimal contract. In the classical adverse selection problem, and given that the model satis¯es
some regularity conditions, pooling contracts are ruled out. In our model, pooling contracts may
be optimal as soon as the di®erence between the highest marginal cost and the lowest one is not
too big. So pooling is an issue when the regulator faces cash-in-advance constraints. Wealth
constraints may lead to low-powered incentive scheme where the regulator pays a constant fee
for a ¯xed quantity.
A Proof of proposition 2
The ¯rst order conditions of P3a r e :











T ¡ µ1q1 ¡ ¢µq2 = 0 (14)
¹2(T ¡ µ2q2)=0 ( 1 5 )
W ek n o wb yl e m m a1t h a t¹ 1>0 if the wealth constraint is relevant. There are two possible
solutions to this system of equation: a separating solution when ¹2 = 0 and a pooling solution
when ¹2 is positive.
If ¹2 > 0, (15) becomes T = µ2q2, then q2 = T
µ2. Replacing this value in (14), we have
q1 = q2 = T
µ2.









T ¡ µ1q1 ¡ ¢µq2 = 0 (18)
To know which solution applies, we check when ¹2 is positive. As long as q2 is smaller than
q1, the transfer T2 is smaller than T. Therefore, the second wealth constraint is slack when
q2 · q1. This corresponds to the following condition:
¹1
v1




where the value of ¹1 is given by (18). Take the limit case where (19) is satis¯ed with equality,
and solve for ¹1 we have: ¹1 = v2µ2µ1
µ1¡v1µ2. As long as the actual ¹1 is smaller than this value (call
it ¹¤
1), q2 is smaller than q1.
5¹¤
1 is negative if µ1 · v1µ2. In this case, whatever T, q2 is smaller than q1, except in the limit
case where T is null where both quantities are set equal to zero.
If µ1 >v 1µ 2, we have to ¯nd the value of T that generates value of ¹1 equals to ¹¤
1.T od o
this, we solve (16), (17) and (18) for T when ¹ = ¹¤
1. This gives a value T
¤ = µ2S0¡1( µ2µ1v2
µ1¡v1µ2).
We anticipate the results of proposition 3 that shows that ¹1 increases when T decreases. Hence,
when T · T
¤ and µ1 >v 1µ 2,¹ 2is positive and the solution is the pooling equilibrium. When
T ¸ T
¤, ¹2 is null and the solution is the separating equilibrium.
The second order conditions of P3 are always satis¯ed thanks to the concavity of the problem.
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